Abstract: Owing to increasing complexity of network configurations with large topology and use of heterogeneous network services, enterprise networks deploy various security measures based on the organisational security policies. Typically, security policy represents the high level requirements for controlling the resource accesses by traffic source, destination, protocol, access time and so on. Security policies are implemented in the network devices (routers, firewalls and so on) in a distributed fashion through various access control lists (ACLs). The ACL configurations may contain different level of inconsistencies which may make the network vulnerable. In addition, there may exist inconsistent 'hidden access paths' in the implementation because of transitive access relationships between the network services. Further, the failure of network link(s) may form alternative routing paths that violate ACL. Manual analysis of this problem can be overwhelming and potentially inaccurate. In this study, a query-based formal security analysis tool has been presented that automates the process using Boolean satisfiability (SAT). The tool allows network administrators to systematically evaluate the distributed ACL configurations through various standard and complex service access queries. The tool evaluates the static access queries through SAT-based decision procedures, and the fault-based queries (under network link failures) through graph mining procedures.
Introduction
The extensive use of various network services for accessing the network resources and the associated security threats forces today's organisations to come up with complex security policies to strengthen the security perimeter over their enterprise networks. However, the enterprise networks often face security threats because of security policy misconfiguration. Typically, an enterprise LAN Q1
consists of a set of logical network zones corresponding to different departments or sections, connected through various interface switches (typically, Layer-3 network devices or routers). The organisational security policies are configured in the network interfaces through a set of access control lists (ACLs) in a distributed manner. In this scenario, the major challenge to the network administrator is to systematically evaluate the ACL implementations with various access queries conforming to the organisational security policy. The access queries may cover static network reachability under different constraints (like, access paths going through or avoiding some network zones, access paths during time periods etc.) and dynamic network reachability (under network link failures). The network packets may be routed through alternative access paths under network link failures. Thus, network administrator may query to check the reachability of various access paths under certain number of link failures. This will in turn help the network administrator to assess the robustness of the existing ACL implementation. The major complexity of this analysis lies in the presence of (i) temporal service access constraints; (ii) intra and inter ACL conflicts; and (iii) inconsistent hidden service access paths in the implementation.
In this paper, a formal query-based security analysis tool, formal integrated network security analysis tool (FINSAT), is presented which is built on top of the basic formalism presented in Section 2. The novel and significant contribution of this paper is providing a formal query analysis interface which will allow the network administrators to systematically evaluate the distributed ACL implementations with various fine-grained access queries. The tool can analyse basic service access reachability and also capable of checking complex queries like, † existence of service access paths during specified time-period, † existence of service access paths going through or avoiding some network zones, † existence of service access paths under k network link failures, † existence of hidden access reachability conflicts and † various combination of queries.
The core component of this tool is a SAT-based modelling and verification engine for evaluation of the access queries. The tool also uses scalable graph mining technique for evaluating fault-based queries. The access queries are specified using a high-level query specification language (QSL). The overall organisational security policy can be also specified as a sequence of [conjunction (∧) or disjunction (∨)] of multiple service access queries.
Rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the overview of previous works on top of which the FINSAT tool is built. In Section 3, the architecture of the proposed security analysis tool has been described. The modelling of network topology and ACL rules as a network access model has been described in Section 3.1. The QSL and modelling of various service access queries in QSL has been described in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the SAT reduction of the network access model and QSL queries. The fault analysis of on network access model with related query processing has been described in Section 3.4. The experimental results with various set of queries under different network access models have been presented in Section 4.
Background
The proposed FINSAT tool allows the users to systematically analyse the distributed ACL implementations with various service access queries. The tool has been built on top of verification [1, 2] and fault analysis [3] framework for analysing the network security implementations proposed by Bera et al. However, these works do not address modelling of distributed ACLs and inter ACL conflicts along various access routes in the network. The proposed FINSAT tool models the distributed ACLs and detects the conflicts using SAT-based decision procedure. This section describes the earlier works.
Modelling the network topology and the ACL configuration
In [1] , it has been shown the extraction of a formal network access model from the network topology and the distributed ACL implementation.
Definition 1 [network access model]:
A network access model is defined as a 3-tuple NG = 〈N, I, F〉, where † N is a finite set of network devices. Again network devices (N) can be of two types: NR indicates a finite set of network routers and NE indicates the end point devices (network zones, workstations or web servers etc.) represented as an IP address block. † I ⊆ N × N is a finite set of network interfaces between network devices, such that for every physical interface between N 1 and D 2 there is a pair of lines or channels: I 12 = 〈N 1 , N 2 〉 and I 21 = 〈N 2 , N 1 〉. Again, network interfaces (I ) can be of two types: IE ⊆ {NR × NE}|{NE × NR} indicates set of network interfaces which connect end point devices to routers; and IR ⊆ {NR × NR} indicates set of interfaces between a pair of routers. A network interface is represented as an IP address. † F is a finite set of ACLs associated to various edges of the graph.
The set I represents the interfaces connecting the routers and network zones. As the ACL rules can be applied in both directions of a link. Typically, there are two links between a pair of routers based on the direction of flow which are represented as separate ports in generic network topology definition. It is to be noted that the classification of the set N (network devices) into NE (end point devices) and NR (routers) is significant only for modelling the Access Route and Access Route ACL as described in Section 3.1.
Hidden access path analysis
The hidden access paths may exist in a network because of the transitive access relationships between various known network services. These hidden access paths can be formally represented as follows
Here, X, Y, Z ∈ N represent network zones and T represents time-constraint. The serv1 and serv2 represent the network services which are transitively dependent to each other.
Fault analysis of security policy implementations
In [3, 4] , it has been shown how fault analysis of network access model under network link failures. This problem is reduced to a problem of finding minimum edge cut (min-cut) of various service flow graphs under the network access model (NG) and then calculating the fault tolerance value of the network access model which represents maximum number of link failures it can tolerate to maintain its consistency. A service flow graph is defined as follows:
V 〉 under the network service V is defined as a connected directed subgraph of the network model NG 〈N, I, F〉, where N V ⊆ N and
The definition states that a service flow graph G V includes only the edges of NG through which corresponding service accesses are allowed.
For analysing the effect of link failures under each service flow graph, the concept of critical links has been introduced.
Definition 3 [critical link]:
A critical link (E CR ) in a service flow graph, G V is an edge which connects an end point device, DE i to a network router, DR j . That is, ∀E CR :
These links are critical (major connecting links to the network zones) because of the fact that the failure of any of these links makes the ACL implementation incorrect unless the links are associated with all 'deny' ACL rules. The fault analysis problem, considers that there is no critical link failures. Hence, the critical links are removed from the service flow graphs prior to the fault analysis procedure.
FINSAT architecture
The proposed FINSAT tool primarily concentrates on analysing the security policy implementations through various service access queries depending on complex access constraints. The tool formally models the network topology and the ACL configurations as a graph-based network access model. Then, it incorporates the ACL conflict analyser and hidden access path analyser to resolve the ACL conflicts and generate a refined network access model.
In this paper, a FINSAT has been presented which takes a network topology and distributed ACL implementation as input and checks the availability of different service access paths under different security constraints. The tool allows users to evaluate both static and fault-based access queries. Through this query-based analysis, FINSAT allows the administrators to trace various security loop holes in the ACL implementations. For specifying the access queries a high-level QSL has been presented. A comprehensive security policy of an organisation can be specified as conjunction (∧) or disjunction (∨) of various access queries. FINSAT models the input network topology and the distributed ACL implementations as a graph-based network access model and evaluates various service access queries using Boolean satisfiability (SAT) analysis and graph mining techniques. The tool not only checks the reachability of different service paths in the network, but it is also capable of checking various complex access queries. It is also capable of evaluating queries under network link failures.
The tool represents the service access queries through a high-level QSL. The queries can be of two types: (i) static topology-based access queries; and (ii) fault-based access queries. FINSAT evaluates the static access queries using Boolean satisfiability analysis (SAT), whereas evaluates the fault-based access queries using graph mining procedures. In both the cases, the tool reports the access path traces after evaluation of the queries. The tool architecture (shown in Fig. 1 ) consists of four interlinked modules: † Network access module † Query specification module † SAT-based verification module † Fault analysis module Network access module parses the network topology and the distributed ACL implementation to extract a graph-based formal network access model. This model is defined as a 3-tuple NG〈N, I, F〉 where N represents the set of network devices which can be either a network zone or a network routers, I represents the set of network interfaces between the network devices and F represents the set of ACLs associated to the interfaces. Intuitively the network access model completely define the service access paths across the network as a combination of 'permit' and 'deny' ACL rules. Then this module represents the individual and distributed ACLs into Boolean models. In this process, the access routes and access route ACLs are formally modelled along all possible routes from a source S to a destination D. Then the conflict analyser incorporates intra and inter ACL conflict analysis procedure for detecting and resolving various types of ACL rule conflicts in the model. In Section 3.1, it has been shown how conflict analysis can be performed using SAT-based decision procedure. After this step, the distributed conflict-free ACLs are combined to a single Boolean function. Thus, the conflict-free network access model represents a Boolean function, M acl (V: service, S: source, D: dest and T: time), which states whether the service V, is allowed between the source S and destination D, at time, T. In M acl , only the 'permit' ACL rules are considered as the 'deny' rules are default and captured by M acl . Then the 'hidden access path analyser' formally models the hidden access rules through a set of quantified Boolean formulas (QBF). This module finally incorporates the QBF clauses in the model to derive a refined network access model, M fin acl . Fault analysis module takes the refined network access model M fin acl as input and derives 'service flow graphs' (G V ) under each network service, V considering the ACL rules associated to the network interfaces (edges of the graph). Then, it finds the min-cut, t V (minimum sized edge cut), for each service flow graph, G V . Finally, the module finds the min(t V ) (smallest min-cut of all the service flow graphs) which represents the 'fault tolerance' value corresponding to the network access model. Thus, the fault analysis module calculates the maximum number of link failures, the network access model can tolerate to maintain its consistency. The details of the fault analysis module have been described in Section 2.3.
The query specification module, represents various type of access queries through a high-level QSL. The queries can be classified into two categories: † Static topology-based access queries † Fault-based access queries
Network access module: modelling distributed ACLs and conflict analysis
The FINSAT tool semantically analyse the network topology and the distributed ACL implementation to extract a graph-based formal network access model, NG〈N, I, F〉 as described in Section 2.1. Once the network access model NG〈N, I, F〉 has been derived, the implementation module represents the individual and distributed ACLs into Boolean models. It models individual ACL F I associated to the interface I into two Boolean functions:
ACLs along all possible access routes between a source S and destination D has been modelled. In this process, the notion of access routes and access route ACLs has been introduced. 
For the purpose of modelling, the Access Route and Access Route ACL, the set N (network devices) has been classified into NE (end pint devices) and NR (routers). Similarly, the set I (interfaces) is divided into two subsets IE and IR. This signifies that, between a pair of (S, D), the ACLs associated to the interfaces along all possible access routes are incorporated in the logical formulation of access route ACL.
The permit rules associated to all the ACLs along an access route AR i are iteratively incorporated in the single Boolean function FP AR i . Similarly, FD AR i function is derived. These two functions are used in interACL consistency analysis described later in this section.
Definition 6 Boolean reduction of M acl : After conflict analysis, the distributed conflict-free ACLs are formally reduced into a single Boolean function
In M acl , only the 'permit' ACL rules are considered as the 'deny' rules are treated as default and captured by M acl .
Hidden access path reduction:
The hidden access paths may exist in a network because of the transitive access relationships between various known network services. The basic formalisation of hidden access paths has been shown in Section 2.2.
The FINSAT hidden access path analyser component reduces the hidden access rules into a set of QBF [5] and incorporates those in the conflict-free network access model, M acl to generate a refined network access model, M fin acl . The QBF reduction of an example hidden access rule has been presented as follows:
Hidden Rule HR1:
Here 
Query specification module
This section describes the high level modelling of various type of access queries in FINSAT tool. A high-level QSL has been proposed for modelling the queries. The access queries can be broadly classified into two categories: (i) static topology-based access queries and (ii) fault-based access queries. The static topology-based access queries evaluates whether a service access path exists with specified constraints under the static network topology (i.e. all network links are 'up') whereas the fault-based access queries ask the tool whether a service access path exists with specified constraints under dynamic network topology (i.e. k links are down). In the proposed FINSAT tool, the static access queries are evaluated by the SAT-based verification module whereas the fault-based access queries do not require interaction of the SAT module. Those queries are processed by the fault analysis module described in Section 3.4.
QSL syntax:
The service access queries with different constraints are represented using a high-level QSL. These queries have the following syntax:
A QSL query typically finds access paths between a source Z s to destination Z d depending on different constraints. Here, the constraints specified within [] are optional. In the WHERE clause the (Service ∈ V ) indicates the network service which is again combination of Protocol(protocol type) and Port(service port number) in the destination zone. In the FROM and TO clauses Z s and Z d indicate the source and destination zones, respectively. The optional time constraint is represented as TIME ∈ T where T is any valid time period. In the proposed model, a valid time period can be combination of 'days in a week' and 'hours and minutes in a day'. The [INCLUDE Z q ] and [EXCLUDE Z p ] clauses indicate the set of network zones to be included or excluded for evaluating the access queries. [HIDDEN H] clause indicates whether 'hidden access rules' to be considered during the evaluation of access queries. H = 1 represents inclusion of hidden access rules whereas H = 0 represents exclusion of hidden access rules. Note that, the static access queries in QSL are reduced into SAT clauses for evaluating thorough quaffle SAT solver. On the other hand, the fault-based queries are analysed by the fault analysis module which will be described later.
QSL semantics:
The proposed FINSAT tool takes the QSL queries as input and evaluates it with respect to the ACL implementation. It results 'yes' or 'no' depending on the query evaluation. The tool reports 'yes', if the access query is satisfiable with respect to the ACL implementation along with satisfiable instance(s). The semantics of QSL queries has been described with various example queries.
Example QUERY1: FIND PATH FROM ZONE_1 TO PROXY WHERE (Protocol ∈ TCP)∧(Port ∈ 80) IN TIME ∈ Weekdays〈07:00 − 17:00〉 HIDDEN H = 1 QUERY1 evaluates to 'yes', if 'http' (TCP,80) access path exists from any node in ZONE_1 to PROXY during 07:00 − 17:00 hours in 'Sunday'. The significance of the query is the administrator may wish to block the 'http' access path from ZONE_1 during 07:00-17:00 hours in Weekdays anyway. Hence, the administrator likes to know whether any such access path exists or not. The inclusion of hidden access rules signifies to check the availability of any such indirect/ hidden access path.
SAT-based verification module: static query processing
FINSAT evaluates the static topology-based access queries using SAT-based verification module. The Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based approach reduces the verification problem into a Boolean formula F and checks its satisfiability. Although satisfiability analysis is NP complete problem, still this technique is becoming popular today because of the tremendous time trade-offs of modern SAT [6] and QBF-SAT solvers [5, 7] . The proposed FINSAT tool reduces the refined network access model M fin acl and the QSL access queries into Boolean functions under the same formalism. Then, the satisfiability of the access query is checked with the model using quaffle SAT solver. The FINSAT tool checks the static access queries using SAT-based verification procedure. The next section describes the Boolean reduction of the network access model M are modelled as disjunction of its valid periods. Each valid time period can contain day of week, hours and minutes and so on. The components of a valid time period are mapped into a set of Boolean variables, namely, (dt 0 , dt 1 , dt 2 ), (th 0 , th 1 , …, th 4 ) and (tm 0 , tm 1 , …, tm 5 ), respectively. Here the granularity of time in minute has been considered. The functional mapping of rule components into Boolean variables is depicted in Fig. 2 
Q2
. Once the rule components are reduced into Boolean clauses, the tool models the intra and inter ACL conflicts into Boolean clauses (described in Section 3.1). The tool detects the conflicts by checking the satisfiability of the conflict clauses using quaffle SAT solver. Once the conflicts are resolved, the tool refines the model incorporating the Boolean clauses for hidden access rules (refer Section 2.2). The refined network access model is represented by the Boolean function M fin acl . The next section describes the SAT reduction of QSL queries.
Reduction of QSL access queries:
The access queries specified in QSL are also reduced into SAT under the same formalism of ACL implementation model. The fault-based access queries are solved through the fault analysis module whereas static access queries are handled by the SAT solver. In this section, SAT formulation of the static access queries has been described. However, the fault-based query processing has been described separately in Section 3.4. The basic QSL query components include source, destination, protocol, service port number, and time-constraint. These components are functionally reduced to a set of Boolean variables under the same formalism as described in the last section. Each query is represented as conjunction (∧) of components. The 'EXCLUDE' and 'INCLUDE' clauses are associated as extra constraint to the query. The 'EXCLUDE' query incorporates (∧) a clause in the SAT query with negation of the Boolean variable associated to a specified zone. The 'INCLUDE' query incorporates (∧) a clause in the SAT query with the Boolean variable associated to a specified zone. The FINSAT tool also allows to analyse the ACL implementation model considering hidden access path analyser as optional. If H = 1, the query is analysed with the refined ACL implementation model including hidden access rules. On the other hand, if H = 0, the hidden access rules are not considered in the analysis. The SAT formulation of the example queries has been described as follows:
SAT formulation of QUERY1:
Here, the queries which requires inclusion of hidden access rules are checked with the refined ACL implementation model M fin acl whereas the queries which do not require to incorporate the hidden access rules are checked with the conflict-free implementation model M acl . The 'INCLUDE'/ 'EXCLUDE' clauses are modelled through extra Boolean clauses which basically check whether the access paths exist through/not through specified network zones. In each case, the result is 'TRUE' if the query is satisfiable (SAT) and the satisfiable instance indicates the corresponding access path. The security policy of the network can be also represented as conjunction (∧) or disjunction (∨) of QSL queries according to the requirement.
Fault analysis module: fault-based QSL query processing
FINSAT evaluates the fault-based QSL queries by calculating the maximum tolerable link failure in the network access model NG and tracing the service flow graphs G V . For example, the evaluation of QUERY3 (refer Section 3.2) has been described as follows:
Example QUERY2:
Evaluation of QUERY3: The input to the fault analysis module is the query path, that is, http〈TCP, 80〉(S, D) and the maximum fault tolerance value 2 specified in the query. The fault analysis module first derives the corresponding service flow graph, G http then checks whether the access path belongs to G http and t NG ≥ 2, where t NG is the maximum allowable fault tolerance value for the refined network access model, NG. The service flow graph construction and fault analysis procedures have been described in [3] [refer Section 2.3].
The query is evaluated to TRUE/'yes' if the conditions are satisfied, otherwise evaluated to FALSE/'no'. For example, the QUERY4 is evaluated in a typical enterprise network shown in Fig. 3 and its ACL configuration shown in Fig. 4 . However, if the query is modified with the clause MAX FAULT 1, then it will be evaluated to 'TRUE'. In that case, the tool reports the access routes as shown in Table 1 . In this way, the fault-based access queries are evaluated by the proposed FINSAT tool.
Evaluation with experimental results
In this section, the performance evaluation of the FINSAT tool is shown with respect to time requirements.
Complexity analysis
The framework has been simulated under 200 different ACL configurations in more than 50 different test networks and 10 million of ACL rules. It has been also tested with real ACL configurations in an Enterprise Network. The impact of network size, ACL rules and complexity of the queries on network model generation, ACL conflict analysis and query I〈R5, R2〉  〈 ZONE_2, R5, R1, R3, PROXY〉  I〈R5, R1〉  〈 ZONE_2, R5, R2, R3, PROXY〉  I〈R2, R3〉  〈 ZONE_2, R5, R1, R3, PROXY〉  I〈R1, R3〉  〈 ZONE_2, R5, R2, R3, PROXY〉  I〈R2, R1〉 〈 ZONE_2, R5, R2, R3, PROXY〉 remaining 〈ZONE_2, R5, R2, R3, PROXY〉 processing and so on have been thoroughly analysed. The analysis has been presented as follows: Impact of network and ACL size on network model generation: In this analysis, the network size is the overall nodes including: routers and network zones. The network size has been used that ranges from 25 to 1000 nodes, with total configuration size (ACL rules) up to 10 million per network. A random ACL generator tool by Al-Shaer et al. [8, 9] has been used for generating synthetic ACLs for experimentation. The tool distributes the ACL rules evenly to different interfaces which allow us to comprehensively evaluate the conflict resolution time and query analysis time appropriately. Fig. 5 shows the impact of network and ACL size on generating the access model. The model generation time is almost linearly dependent on both network and ACL size. It can be observed that this time lies within 8 s for 1000 nodes and 1000 ACL rules/node (i.e. total 10 million ACL rules). Thus for large scale networks, the framework generates the network model in reasonably good time. The proposed FINSAT tool has been evaluated with various access queries under different ACL configurations for our test network. Table 2 shows runtime results for different test cases. The result reports the network access model size (#N,#I) , the number of ACLs (#ACL) and total ACL rules (#rules) under each test case. The network access model extraction time is represented by T NG . The static topology-based query processing time (T QS ) has two components; (i) SAT reduction time of QSL query and ACL implementation and (ii) quaffle run time. The parameters T QR and T E indicate the average SAT reduction time and quaflle run time, respectively. The result shows that the SAT reduction time is linearly dependent on the number of ACL rules, whereas the quaffle run time depends on the internal evaluation of SAT query which almost remains constant. Fig. 7 shows the query processing time for different type of SAT-based queries with changing network access model NG. It has been observed that, for a particular network access model, the average SAT-based query processing time for different static access queries almost remain constant.
Impact of network and ACL size on conflict analysis: SAT reduction time of conflict analysis procedure is linearly dependent on the network and ACL size. On the other hand, the quaffle run-time (for conflict detection) is dependent on the total number of Boolean variables (almost remains constant with varying ACL size) that lies within a second for 1 million of ACL rules. Thus, the overall conflict analysis time is linearly dependent on the network and ACL size. Fig. 6 shows that the analysis time lies within 5 seconds for 1000 network nodes and a total of 10 million ACL rules.
Impact ACL size on static query processing: The SAT-based query processing time has two components, (i) SAT reduction time of the model and query; and (ii) quaffle run-time. Fig. 7 shows that the SAT reduction time is linearly dependent on the ACL rule size. However, the quaffle run-time depends on the total number of Boolean variables (almost remains constant with varying ACL size and additional variables incurred for the hidden access rules). The static query processing time lies within 7 seconds for a total of 1 million ACL rules. It has been observed that, for a particular network access model, the processing time almost remains same for different variations of static queries (such as, finding direct access path, finding access path excluding/including a particular network zone, temporal access paths etc.)
Impact of ACL Network size and ACL rules on fault-based query processing: Fault based query processing time consists of three components (i) service flow graph construction time, (ii) min-cut finding time and (iii) graph traversal time. The impact of network and ACL size on these components have been shown in Fig. 8 . It shows that service flow graph construction time is almost linearly dependent on the number of active network nodes under each service. On the other hand, the framework uses efficient algorithm presented in [10] for finding min-cut of the service flow Fig. 8 shows, the network size has a considerable impact (almost exponential) on min-cut finding time. Fig. 9 shows the overall fault-based query processing time with varying network and ACL size. The test has been performed with varying the network size between 100 and 1000 (with 100-1000 ACL rules per node). It reports that, for 1000 network nodes and 10 million of ACL rules, the average fault-based query processing time lies within 35 s. The analysis shows that the SAT-based evaluation procedure works considerably better than graph mining-based query evaluation (Fig. 10) Q3 . From the above analysis, it has been observed that, the fault-based query processing requires significantly more time than SAT queries. Thus, the proposed framework uses SAT-based decision procedure in most of the analysis. However, graph mining-based decision procedure can be used comprehensively for in-depth query processing depending on various network constraints like, bandwidth, network congestion and policy-based routing.
Related work
Existing literatures on network security analysis primarily concentrate on inconsistency and redundancy checks but most of the works are not formally verified [11] . Although formal verifications are mostly used for electronic chip verification [12] , the same methods can be used for network security verification as well. Tools that allow user queries for the purpose of firewall analysis and management include Firmato [13] and Lumeta [14] . These tools can specify an abstract network access control policy and firewall rules that satisfy that policy but lacks in incorporating temporal constraints and hidden rule analysis. Al-Shaer and Hamed [15] worked on the Firewall Policy Advisor. However, both of these tools can handle a specific set of problems and simple set of policy constraints. Matousek et al. [16] proposed a formal model for network wide security analysis. Recent work for detection of anomalies in web access control by Hu et al. [17] can be referred in the line. In recent days, C2 L [18] is another such tool proposed for cloud computing.
In the same line of work, FIREMAN [19] tool uses BDD-based modelling for detecting conflicts in distributed network firewall configurations. Quarnet [20] is another tool which uses firewall decision diagram (FDD) for modelling the ACL configurations in a static network and for querying about various type of static reachability in the network. Recently, Liu and Gouda [21] proposed a framework for evaluating firewall policy queries. They have used FDDs for representing the firewall rules and deployed algorithms for querying about the packets to be accepted and denied through the firewalls. Configchecker [8] is also another tool that uses formal methods to check correctness of the network configuration. However, none of these tools analyse temporal access constraints in the configurations. In addition, these tools do not analyse the effect of link failures in the ACL configurations. Moreover, the analysis of 'hidden access paths' in the ACL configurations has not been addressed earlier; which plays a significant role in checking the correctness of the policy-based security implementations. The results of FINSAT tool, show that the SAT-based query analysis performs better. However, graph mining-based query analysis may help in evaluating various in-depth queries with different network constraints. Most importantly, the proposed FINSAT tool is capable of evaluating various complex access queries (like, presence of access paths going through/avoiding some network zones and presence of access paths under network link failures). The experimental results show the efficacy of the tool in large scale enterprise networks.
Conclusion
In today's complex enterprise networks, there is an increasing requirement of analysing the distributed security implementations to enforce the organisational security policy. It is becoming more difficult because of complex security requirements of the organisations with various type of access constraints as well as dynamic changes in network topology. Thus there is a need of an integrated security analysis tool to determine the correctness of the security implementations along with various network access traces under both static and dynamic topology environments (varying network access configurations). Moreover, from the network administrator's point of view, there is a need of tracing out various inconsistent service access paths because of transitive access dependencies between various services. This will help the administrator to automatically determine the security policy mis-configurations in the implementations. In this paper, a formal network security analysis tool (FINSAT) has been presented which takes a network topology and the distributed ACL implementations as input; detects the intra and inter ACL conflicts and allows the users to evaluate various service access queries under both static and dynamic network topology. Apart from basic path finding queries, FINSAT can evaluate different nontrivial access queries depending on complex constraints.
The efficacy of FINSAT has been evaluated with various service access queries under 200 different ACL configurations in more than 50 different test networks with 10 million of ACL rules. Tool performs considerably well compared with these tools. Finally, the uniqueness of FINSAT tool lies in comprehensive and systematic analysis of distributed security configurations with varieties of complex access queries under both static and dynamic network topology. However, usability and extensibility of query language might be a major concern for the tool. Accommodating new type queries, user-defined constraints with various network layer parameters could be added in the tool. FINSAT can detect violations but resolving those conflicts is beyond the scope of it. MinCostSAT can be used to find optimal solutions to a particular violation. Reduction of the access control specification into Boolean clause is semi-automated. Instead of real-time traffic from an enterprise network, synthetic networks are used for analysis. Overcoming these limitations are the future scope of this work.
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